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I.  INTRODUCTION 
They hounded her at work.  They called her employers, digging for information.  
They “harassed and bullied” her in front of her children.  They threatened to post 
sheriff notices in her yard and in the newspapers.  They threatened to levy her wages.  
They placed a lien on her home.  They seized her only retirement savings.  They 
destroyed her credit rating.  But worst of all, they stole her pride.  Who is “they” one 
may ask?  The answer would not be a surprise to many Americans: agents of the 
Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.). 
Josephine Berman was the woman subjected to these events.  While married, 
Josephine Berman signed joint income tax returns with her husband.  Her husband 
claimed deductions for legal expenses incurred during litigation with his partner in 
an S corporation, which the I.R.S. disallowed, thereby creating a tax deficiency of 
$62,000.  The I.R.S. then located Josephine and assessed her for the deficiency, 
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never attempting to locate her ex-husband.  Due to penalties and interest, Josephine 
now owes approximately $400,000 to the I.R.S. for the tax deficiency.1 
Filing joint income tax returns creates joint and several liability for which either 
spouse can be held responsible.2  Prior to the enactment of the Internal Revenue 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, the only opportunity for either spouse to 
escape such liability was to both request “innocent spouse” relief.  Unfortunately, 
“innocent spouse” relief could be obtained only through proving a myriad of difficult 
standards.  Since many truly “innocent spouses,” such as Josephine Berman, could 
not establish one or more of the requirements to obtain relief,3 they were held liable 
for mistakes they did not make and problems they did not create.  Cries for reform 
led Congress to consider appropriate revisions to the “innocent spouse” provision.  
As a result, Congress repealed the former code section granting “innocent spouse 
relief and enacted a new code section pertaining to “innocent spouse” relief.4  This 
article will examine the criticisms of the previous “innocent spouse” provision and 
proposals for reform that aided Congress in enacting a more equitable provision.  
The new “innocent spouse” provision, § 6015,5 will be dissected to reveal the 
requirements, as well as the changes from the old provision.  Also provided in this 
article will be examples of the new provision applied to cases decided under the old 
“innocent spouse” provision.  Completing this article will be criticisms of the new 
provision and I.R.S. actions regarding the new provision. 
II.  BRIEF HISTORY OF “INNOCENT SPOUSE” RELIEF 
The joint return was introduced in 1918.6  However, joint and several liability 
arising from joint returns was not formally established until 1938 with the 
implementation of the Revenue Act of 1938, which required that married couples 
filing jointly be held jointly and severally liable for taxes due on the joint return.7  In 
1971, Congress enacted an “innocent spouse” provision to protect unsuspecting 
spouses from the imposition of tax liability in situations where one spouse omitted 
income from the joint return.8  In 1984, the “innocent spouse” provision was 
amended to provide relief to an “innocent spouse” for a tax deficiency arising from 
grossly erroneous deductions, credits, or basis attributable to the other spouse.9  This 
                                                                
1Innocent Spouse Issues: Restructuring Hearing on the Internal Revenue Service Before 
the Senate Committee on Finance, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Josephine Berman). 
2I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1997).  Section 6013(d)(3) provides: “[I]f a joint return is made, the 
tax shall be computed on the aggregate income and the liability with respect to the tax shall be 
joint and several.” 
3See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (explaining these requirements). 
4I.R.C. § 6013(e), as in effect prior to the Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Act 
of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as old § 6013(e)]. 
5I.R.C. § 6015 (1998). 
6Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, ch. 18 § 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074 (1918). 
7Revenue Act of 1938, Pub.  L. No. 75-554, 52 Stat. 447, 476 (1938). 
8Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063 (1971). 
9Old § 6013(e), supra note 4. 
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provision provided relief from joint and several liability if the spouse seeking such 
relief was able to prove the following requirements:  
A.) a joint tax return was made for the taxable year; 
B.) on such joint return there was a substantial understatement of tax 
attributable to grossly erroneous items of one spouse; 
C.) the other spouse was able to establish that he/she did not know nor had 
any reason to know of such a substantial understatement; 
D.) in consideration of all the facts and circumstances, it would be 
inequitable to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency attributable to 
such understatement.10 
III.  PROBLEMS WITH THE FORMER “INNOCENT SPOUSE” PROVISIONS 
Though the purpose of the “innocent spouse” provision was noble, the 
requirements of I.R.C.  '6013(e) were too difficult for many “innocent spouses” to 
overcome.  Problems in interpretation and application arose with respect to almost 
every requirement under I.R.C. § 6013(e).  Only the requirement of a joint return 
was generally unproblematic.11  Criticisms of the other requirements, though, were 
numerous. 
A.  Requirement of a Substantial Understatement of Tax Attributable to Grossly 
Erroneous Items of One Spouse 
A “substantial understatement” of tax was explicitly described as an 
understatement exceeding $500.12  The General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded 
that the dollar threshold excluded some “innocent spouses” from relief and was 
“inconsistent with the goal of providing relief to deserving taxpayers.”13  Poorer 
                                                                
10Id. 
11Old I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(A), supra note 4.  The filing of a joint return was usually one of 
fact.  Basically, only in situations in which a joint return was filed but not signed by both 
spouses or a spouse claims to not have intended to sign the return was this requirement 
questioned.  In situations where the return was not signed by both spouses, the Tax Court has 
used a “tacit consent” rule, assuming that the joint return was consented to by the nonsigning 
spouse if that spouse did not object and did not file a separate return.  See, e.g., Ebeling v. 
Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3102 (1994).  The Tax Court considered the following 
factors to determine if the nonsigning spouse consented: (1) “whether the nonsigning spouse 
received any of the benefits of the joint return,” (2) “the couple’s history of filing joint 
returns,” (3) “whether the nonsigning spouse’s income and expenses were reported on the joint 
return.”  Id.  at 3103.  In situations where the spouse claims to not have intended to file a joint 
return, the court reviews the intent, considering the history of filing joint returns.  See, e.g., 
Riportella v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 869 (1981).  The taxpayer has the burden of 
proving that he/she did not intend to file a joint return.  Id. 
12Old § 6013(e)(3), supra note 4. 
13GAO Suggest Improvement to IRS’s Innocent Spouse Procedures, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 
49-20 (1997), Doc 97-7078 (44 pages) [hereinafter GAO Suggests Improvements].  Pursuant to 
§ 401 of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996), the 
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taxpayers with smaller liabilities were often unable to meet this dollar threshold in 
order to obtain relief.14  Critics argued that if the purpose of the section was to 
provide relief, a dollar limitation should not apply to a truly “innocent spouse.”15 
The understatement was also required to exceed a specified percentage of 
adjusted gross income based on the most recent year before the deficiency notice was 
mailed if the understatement related to a deduction, credit, or basis.16  The GAO cited 
examples of the application of such specified percentages and found that the 
thresholds instead related to a taxpayer’s ability to pay or degree of hardship rather 
than the taxpayer’s innocence.17  The basis for determining the specified percentage 
of adjusted gross income was the preadjustment year, i.e., the most recent year 
before the deficiency notice was filed, and not the year in which the joint return was 
filed.  The American Bar Association described this preadjustment year test as 
“irrelevant to the justification for avoidance of the liability” since the taxpayer’s 
liability could have been large but not large enough to overcome the percentage 
requirements.18  The GAO estimated that approximately 40,000 additional “innocent 
spouses” could have been eligible for relief under I.R.C. § 6013(e) if these dollar 
thresholds had not existed.19 
                                                          
General Accounting Office studied and reported on issues regarding joint and several liability, 
including: (1) the potential universe of taxpayers that may have been eligible for innocent 
spouse relief, (2) the I.R.S.’s practices and procedures for handling requests for innocent 
spouse relief, (3) whether the innocent spouse provisions provided the same treatment for all 
taxpayers, (4) the potential effects of replacing the joint and several liability standard with 
proportionate liability, (5) the potential effects of requiring the I.R.S. to abide by divorce 
decrees that allocate tax liabilities, (6) the potential effects on the I.R.S. of changing the law so 
that community income of one spouse couldn’t be seized to satisfy tax liabilities incurred by 
the other spouse before their marriage.  Id. 
14See, e.g., Wolski v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3141 (1994) (Robert Wolski was 
unable to obtain “innocent spouse” relief because the tax deficiency arising from a joint return 
filed with his wife was only $256). 
15Ted S. Biderman, The Continued Folly of the Innocent Spouse Defense: Is It Viable, 45 
DRAKE L. REV. 551, 553 (1997). 
16Old § 6013(e)(4), supra note 4.  This section provided: 
A.  if the spouse’s adjusted gross income for the preadjustment year is $20,000 or less, 
this subsection shall apply only if the liability... is greater that 10% of such adjusted 
gross income. 
B.  if the spouse’s adjusted gross income for the preadjustment year is more than 
$20,000, subparagraph (A) shall be applied by substituting 25% for 10%. 
Id.  The preadjustment year was the most recent taxable year of the spouse ending before 
the date the deficiency notice was mailed.  Id. 
17GAO Suggests Improvements, supra note 13, at ¶ 31.  The GAO dissected the specified 
percentage requirements, stating that a taxpayer with an AGI of $20,000 or less would be able 
to obtain relief only on assessments of $2,000 or less while a taxpayer with an AGI of over 
$20,000 would be able to obtain relief only on assessments of over $5,000.  Id. 
18American Bar Association, Comments on the Liability of Divorced Spouses for Tax 
Deficiencies on Previously Filed Joint Returns, 50 TAX LAW. 395, 403 (1997). 
19Joint Liability and Its Impact on Innocent Spouses: Hearing on Alternatives for 
Improving Innocent Spouse Relief Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 105th 
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Under I.R.C. § 6013(e), “grossly erroneous” items constituted an omission from 
gross income or a deduction, credit, or basis for an amount “in which there is not 
basis in law or in fact.”20  Courts did not uniformly interpret the clause “basis in law 
or in fact” since legislative history of the statute failed to provide guidance.21  The 
spouse attempting to obtain relief was also given the often impossible task of proving 
that a deduction had no basis in law or in fact.  The spouse attempting to prove the 
deduction frequently did not have any records or information regarding the 
deduction.22  The American Bar Association recognized that this was especially a 
problem when the spouses were divorced since the spouse claiming “innocent 
spouse” would have very little chance of obtaining the records necessary to prove 
that the deduction was either correct or had no basis in law or fact.  The ABA thus 
recommended that the test be abandoned.23 
B.  Knowledge or Reason to Know Requirement 
The spouse seeking “innocent spouse” relief must have proven that he/she did not 
have knowledge nor had any reason to know about the items in question.24  Courts, 
though, had varying interpretations of what constituted such knowledge.  The Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a person with ordinary intelligence would know if 
there was a substantial chance of the existence of a discrepancy and would have 
exercised reasonable care to determine if such a discrepancy existed.25  The Second, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts instead considered factors such as the level of the 
taxpayer’s education and involvement in the family’s financial affairs or the presence 
of lavish expenditures to determine if the taxpayer had knowledge of the items.26  
The Tax Court would review to see if constructive knowledge existed by determin-
ing if the taxpayer knew or should have known the transaction produced income or if 
the taxpayer knew the transaction produced a deduction.27  Without uniformity 
between the courts, choice of forum often made the difference to those requesting 
relief.28 
The knowledge test was also recognized by critics as a “Catch-22," since the 
taxpayer had to simultaneously prove that her/his spouse’s action was illegal and that 
                                                          
Legis., (1998) (testimony of United States General Accounting Office’s Director Lynda D. 
Willis). 
20Old § 6013(e)(2), supra note 4. 
21Lisa K. Edison-Smith, If You Love Me, You’ll Sign My Tax Returns: Spousal Joint and 
Several Liability for Federal Income Taxes and the Innocent Spouse Exception, 18 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 102, 107 (1994) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 1502). 
22Id. at 111. 
23American Bar Association, supra note 18, at 403. 
24Old § 6013(e)(1)(C), supra note 4; Edison-Smith, supra note 21, at 111. 
25Shea v. Commissioner, 780 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1986). 
26See, e.g.,  Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1256 (2d Cir. 1993). 
27See, e.g., Bokum v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126 (1990). 
28Biderman, supra note 15, at 562. 
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she/he did not know about it.29  The lack of uniformity in the courts in interpreting 
the test and the difficulty in proving lack of knowledge hindered many  “innocent 
spouses” from obtaining relief. 
C.  Requirement that it Would be Inequitable to Hold the Taxpayer Liable 
Because the requirements of I.R.C. § 6013(e) were read conjunctively, a taxpayer 
could still be held liable even if it was found to be inequitable.30  Possible “innocent 
spouses” were further denied relief under I.R.C. § 6013(e) because courts tied the 
inequitable test to a consideration of any “significant benefit” the taxpayer may have 
gotten from the item in question.  If the item in question somehow allowed the 
taxpayer to enjoy benefits substantially varying from the taxpayer’s normal lifestyle, 
the courts held that the taxpayer should have known about the item.31  Thus, even if 
facts and circumstances indicated that it would be inequitable to hold the spouse 
liable,32 courts could preclude exoneration from liability by twisting the requirement 
around to additionally test the knowledge requirement. 
IV.  CRITICISMS AND PROPOSALS 
As critics, scholars, and courts discussed the problems and deficiencies of the 
“innocent spouse” provision, an increasing number of suggestions and 
recommendations for changes were published.  Some scholars urged the repeal of 
joint liability,33 others for the repeal of joint filing.34  The General Accounting Office, 
Treasury Department, American Bar Association, and American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants all published recommendations on how to fix the mess.35 
                                                                
29H.J. Cummins, Catch 1040: Joint Returns Mean Joint Liability - and in Some Cases, that 
Means Trouble, NEWSDAY, Jan. 30, 1994, at 76 (quoting James Lewis, director of free tax 
clinic at Yeshiva University’s Benjamin N. Cardoza Law School). 
30See, e.g., Jackson v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 356 (1979) (holding a widow liable for her 
deceased husband’s tax liability because she did not meet all the other requirements of I.R.C. 
§ 6013(e), even though the court found it to be inequitable to hold her liable). 
31Biderman, supra note 15, at 558 (citing Buchine v. Commissioner, 20 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 
1994)). 
32Old § 6013(e)(1)(D), supra note 4. 
33See, e.g., Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability 
for Taxes Should be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317, 329 (1990); Edison-Smith, supra note 
21; Marjorie Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the I.R.S.: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint 
Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993); C. Ian McLachlan, Spousal Liability and 
Federal Income Taxes, 10 J. AM. ACAD. MARTIM. LAW. 65 (1993); Stephan A. Zorn, Innocent 
Spouses, Reasonable Women and Divorce: The Gap Between Reality and the Internal Revenue 
Code, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 421 (1996). 
34See, e.g., Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing 
the Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J. L. & POL. 241 (1997); Pamela B. Gann, 
Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1 
(1980); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994). 
35See, GAO Suggests Improvements, supra note 13; Treasury Report to Congress on Joint 
Liability and Innocent Spouse Issues, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 28-14 (1998), Doc 98-5641 (64 
pages) [hereinafter Treasury Report]; ABA Members Recommend Changes in Innocent 
Spouse Rules, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 150-30 (1996), Doc 96-21543 (48 pages) [hereinafter 
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Critics did not only criticize the requirements of I.R.C. Section 6013(e) but also 
joint and several liability itself.  Most spouses are unaware of the joint and several 
liability arising from filing joint returns.  Tax forms did not include any warning of 
the joint and several liability.36  The General Accounting Office also noted that I.R.S. 
publications failed to provide adequate information on how to obtain “innocent 
spouse” relief, citing this as the reason that the I.R.S. received relatively few 
“innocent spouse” relief requests.37  No set procedures or guidance defined how to 
request “innocent spouse relief.”38 
Critics argue that joint liability is based on an outdated concept of marriage.39  
When joint liability was introduced in 1938, marriages were more stable than today 
and a couple could be rationally viewed as a single economic unit.  However, with 
around half of all marriages ending in divorce, taxpayers are less likely to stay such a 
single economic unit and often do not even share assets during marriage.40  
Enforcing joint and several liability seems irrational when the marriage may end 
sooner than the liability does.41 
Joint liability also unfairly burdens women.  Because women are more likely to 
stay in the family home after divorce, the I.R.S. predominantly attempts collection 
from them since they are easier to locate.  Richard Beck testified before the House 
Ways and Means Committee that over 90% of the joint liability collections are 
against women.42  This effect results from the I.R.S.’s ability to collect from 
whichever spouse it chooses.  In cases of divorce, the consequence of tax collection 
from joint liability is extremely harsh on women.  Since a woman’s standard of 
living most often decreases after divorce, the effects of I.R.S.’s attempt at collection 
of tax deficiencies places the woman in an even more unstable financial position.43 
                                                          
ABA Members Recommend]; AICPA PROPOSAL COMMENTS ON NOTICE 96-19, STUDY ON 
JOINT RETURN AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY ISSUES FOR DIVORCED AND SEPARATED TAXPAYERS 
(July 2, 1996) (proposal was provided directly to the I.R.S.) [hereinafter AICPA PROPOSAL]. 
36Innocent Spouse Issues: Hearing on Taxpayer Rights Before the House Committee of 
Ways and Means, 105th Legis., (1998) (testimony of Richard Beck).  Beck testified to the 
House Committee that there is no joint and several liability clause on the Form 1040s which 
would notify the taxpayers of the joint and several liability.  He noted that most of those 
taxpayers held joint and severally liable are surprised.  Id. 
37GAO Suggests Improvements, supra note 13, at ¶ 8. 
38Id. 
39See, e.g., Edison-Smith, supra note 21, at 122-23; Marjorie Kornhauser, Theory v. 
Reality: The Partnership Model of Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1413 (1996). 
40Id. 
41Id.  Also, in most situations the statute of limitations for a tax deficiency is within three 
years after the return was filed.  I.R.C. § 6501(a)(1998).  But, if there was an omission from 
gross income of an amount in excess of the gross income reported on the return, the statute of 
limitation is instead six years.  I.R.C. § 6501(e). 
42Beck, supra note 36. 
43Id. at 329. 
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Furthermore, studies by scholars suggest that men are more likely to cause a tax 
deficiency.44  Men are more likely to be self-employed, which enables them to 
conceal income easier than people employed by someone else.45  Psychological 
studies have also been conducted regarding the reporting manners of men and 
women, and the results indicate that men are more likely to have more aggressive 
reporting practices.46  For example, men are more prone to claim an improper 
deduction.  Also, because men still have higher earnings on average than women, the 
deficiencies on the return are most likely attributable more often to the husband. 
The effects of joint liability violate the fairness and ability-to-pay norms.  Joint 
and several liability allows the collection of taxes from either person, even the 
“innocent spouse” who did not even earn that income.47  Since men on average earn 
higher salaries than women but women are pinpointed for collections of tax 
deficiencies, the cost of joint liability is usually born by the wrong spouse.  
Generally, men benefit the most from joint liability as the higher earner, while the 
wife incurs additional liability for his portion of the taxes.48  The argument that a 
significant benefit is available to spouses by filing jointly49 does not justify joint 
liability for an amount greater than the actual tax savings that was gained from filing 
jointly.50  Critics for the repeal of joint liability point out that the “abolition of joint 
and several liability would simply assign responsibility for payment where it belongs 
— with the earner of it.”51 
The United States is the only major country in the world that enforces joint and 
several liability.  Critics argue that this is ludicrous when the United States has the 
highest divorce rate.52  The repeal of joint and several liability would eliminate any 
problems with the “innocent spouse” provision since such a provision would not be 
needed.  No instances of inequitable liability would occur since each person would 
                                                                
44Amy C. Christian, Joint and Several Liability and the Joint Return: Its Implications for 
Women, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 535, 595 (1998). 
45Id.  Christian also points out that if the men are more likely to be self employed, the 
I.R.S. has a tendency to attempt to collect from the wives because more often the wives would 
be employed by someone else and the I.R.S. could more easily garnish the wives’ wages to 
pay for the liability.  Id. 
46Id. 
47Beck, supra note 33, at 325. 
48Id. at 376. 
49Couples can enjoy a “marriage bonus” by filing a joint return.  Due to the progressive 
nature of the tax rates, couples who file jointly are able to shift income from the higher earner 
to the lower earner to allow the higher earner’s income to be taxed in a lower tax bracket.  A 
tax savings results.  This effect is built into tax rate tables themselves.  I.R.C. § 1(a) provides 
the tax rates for married individuals filing joint returns.   
Because most married couples still do not have equal incomes, more married couples 
filing jointly obtain a “marriage bonus.”  Approximately 95% of married taxpayers file jointly 
to take advantage of the tax rate schedule.  Treasury Report, supra note 35, at ¶ 28. 
50Beck, supra note 36. 
51Zorn, supra note 33, at 490. 
52Beck, supra note 33, at 383. 
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be assessed for the tax deficiency attributable to his/her wages.  Critics argued that 
the abolition of joint liability would not create any substantial problems, pointing to 
the married-filing-separately returns available now and the formula provided in 
Revenue Ruling 80-6 to determine separate proportional liability.53 
Some critics recognized the problems could be resolved not by repealing the joint 
and several liability provision in I.R.C. § 601354 but by abolishing joint returns.55  
Problems arising from the filing of joint returns, such as joint and several liability, 
would vanish.  Critics contend joint returns represents a system that “fits poorly with 
American attitudes and living patterns.”56  Empirical evidence shows that as many as 
50 percent of all couples do not pool their finances nor believe in such a system.57  
Without evidence that couples even view themselves as one economic unit, it seems 
irrational to allow them the choice to file joint returns which operate under the 
assumption that the couple is a single economic unit.  Changing views of marriage 
and relationships require the elimination of the joint return.  As critic Lawrence 
Zelenek wrote, “[a] system that is right for one time and place may be wrong for 
another.”58 
In response to the requirements under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2,59 both the 
GAO and the Treasury Department published their own analysis of the suggestions 
to solve the deficiencies regarding joint and several liability.  Both the GAO and 
Treasury evaluated various proposals, determined the problems under each, and 
determined recommendations based on their findings.  The GAO and the Treasury 
then reported their findings to Congress. 
The GAO reviewed three prevalent options: 1) the elimination of joint returns, 2) 
the modification of joint returns into a column for each spouse, and 3) the application 
of proportionate liability when there was a delinquent or subsequent tax 
assessment.60  The elimination of joint returns would be beneficial in clearly 
establishing each spouse’s individual liability, at the cost of preparing two separate 
returns and receiving no true benefit while married under the current tax rate 
structure.61  Required filing of separate returns would also substantially increase 
costs to the I.R.S. due to processing and matching informational returns to income 
reported for approximately 48 million more tax returns a year.62  The true effect of 
                                                                
53Id. at 394 (citing Revenue Ruling 80-6, 1980-1 C.B. 296). 
54I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3).   
55Zelenak, supra note 34, at 405. 
56Id. 
57Kornhauser, supra note 33, at 86 (determining such a percentage by reviewing the 
conclusions of three studies regarding issues of marriage and money).  Id. at 85-91. 
58Zelenak, supra note 34, at 404-05. 
59Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, supra note 13. 
60GAO Suggest Improvements, supra note 13, at ¶ 39. 
61Id. at ¶ 39, table 1. 
62Id. at ¶ 44. 
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such a proposal is best reflected in monetary terms:  The I.R.S. would have to spend 
approximately $199 million a year to process the additional tax returns.63 
The proposals to modify joint returns to reflect a column for each spouse in order 
to determine the proportional liability of each spouse posed many of the same 
problems raised by the elimination of joint returns.  While the individual liability of 
each spouse would be established by use of the forms, the benefit would not 
outweigh the costs to the I.R.S.  The estimated cost for the additional data entry that 
would be required under this proposal was $19 million.64  The GAO identified a 
significant burden to taxpayers implicated under both the proposal for separate 
returns and the proposal for modified returns.  Of the 48 million couples that file 
jointly, only 9% had unpaid tax liabilities or subsequent tax assessments.65  To 
change the current filing system for only 9% of joint filers would defy logic.  Also, 
under both separate and modified filing proposals, it would be difficult for the I.R.S. 
to determine if jointly held income was correctly apportioned.66 
Though the GAO assessed that proportionate liability would be the least costly 
option, it recognized that such proportionate liability would also have administrative 
burdens on the I.R.S.67  The GAO did not, however, recommend this proposal or the 
proposal for separate or modified filing.  The GAO instead recommended that the 
I.R.S. (1) develop new or modify existing publications to better inform and educate 
taxpayers about the availability and requirements for “innocent spouse” relief and (2) 
develop tax forms and procedures to request “innocent spouse” relief.68 
Similar to the GAO, the Treasury Department evaluated various proposals for 
their respective strengths and weaknesses and determined if each proposal would 
substantially increase or decrease the burden on taxpayers and the government and if 
the proposal would attain the goal of lessening the current difficulties with joint and 
several liability. 69  The Treasury reviewed proposals for: 1.) mandatory separate 
returns, 2.) proportionate liability, 3.) allocated liability, 4.) liability in accordance 
with divorce decrees, and 5.) improvements to the innocent spouse provisions.70 
The Treasury noted many of the same problems as the GAO in the proposal for 
mandatory separate filing, noting that benefits would not overcome the burdens and 
complexities that would arise.  Mandatory separate returns would increase the 
administrative burden on the I.R.S., violating the basic premise on which joint 
returns were first introduced.71  Furthermore, because a formula would be used to 
                                                                
63Id. 
64Id. at ¶¶ 39, 42. 
65GAO Suggest Improvements, supra note 13, at ¶ 40. 
66Id. at ¶ 44. 
67Id. at ¶¶ 47, 63. 
68Id. at ¶ 64. 
69Treasury Report, supra note 35, at ¶ 81. 
70Id. 
71Id. at ¶ 88.  The Treasury noted that the legislative history on joint returns indicates that 
the main purpose was for administrative ease on the I.R.S.  See H.R. 1860, 75th Cong., 2d 
sess., 1939-1 C.B. 749 (1939). 
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allocate tax items, the Treasury concluded that this would inevitably result in 
allocation not reflective of the spouse’s actual contributions, undercutting the 
rationale of requiring separate filing.72 
The Treasury reviewed front-end proportionate liability proposals which would 
require married taxpayers to file jointly but separately report tax items on the return.  
Again, the Treasury, like the GAO, noted administrative burdens on the I.R.S., such 
as the costs to change the computer systems and to enter the additional data.73  
“innocent spouse” provisions would still be required to provide relief in situations 
where the allocation on the tax return between the spouses was incorrect.74 
The back-end proportional liability proposal by the American Bar Association 
would allow married couples to file a joint return and would require allocation of 
items only upon either spouse’s election after the assessment of unpaid taxes or 
assertion of a tax deficiency.75  The Treasury found that taxpayers would be required 
to maintain extensive and sufficient records in case of unpaid taxes or a tax 
deficiency but that the proposal would not adversely affect the I.R.S.’ return- 
processing procedures.76  Though this proposal would preserve the benefits of filing 
jointly, some “innocent spouse” relief would still be required to protect an “innocent 
spouse” in situations where the spouse overpaid his/her relative tax liability but not 
the joint liability.77 
The Treasury critiqued the American Institute of Certified Public Accountant’s 
proposal for an allocated liability standard.78  The allocated-liability proposal would 
allow the filing of a joint return but once the joint tax liability was determined, the 
spouses would provide an allocation to each spouse of that total joint tax liability on 
their return.  A default rule would provide 50/50 allocation.79  However, spouses 
would run into difficulty in determining the allocation and the possibility of collusive 
abuse between spouses would arise.  For example, the spouses could allocate most of 
the liability to the spouse without any assets.80  The Treasury also concluded that an 
“innocent spouse” provision would still be required for relief on disputes regarding 
the allocation.81 
The Treasury also found problems in the proposal to allocate liability pursuant to 
divorce decrees.  Due to the nature of divorce proceedings, a fair allocation would be 
unlikely and the Treasury was not clear on how the government’s interest in 
collecting the proper amount of revenue could be protected.82 
                                                                
72Treasury Report, supra note 35, at ¶ 91. 
73Id. at ¶ 114-17. 
74Id. at ¶ 125.   
75Id. at ¶ 126 (referring to ABA Members Recommend Changes, supra note 35). 
76Treasury Report, supra note 35, at ¶ 133-35. 
77Id. at ¶ 140. 
78AICPA PROPOSAL, supra note 35. 
79Treasury Report, supra note 35, at ¶ 146. 
80Id. at ¶ 153. 
81Id. at ¶ 156. 
82Id. at ¶ 160-63. 
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After review of the different proposals, the Treasury concluded that the most 
appropriate method to decrease the problems arising from joint and several liability 
was to reform the “innocent spouse” provision to accommodate more cases.  The 
Treasury specifically suggested that the requirement of a “substantial 
understatement” be amended to include any underpayment of tax and not include any 
dollar thresholds.83  With respect to the “grossly erroneous” requirement, the 
Treasury recommended the elimination of “no-basis-in-law-or-in- fact” test to 
equalize treatment of similarly situation taxpayers.  Further, it recommended 
elimination of the requirement that an understatement be attributable to a grossly 
erroneous item to extend relief to situations where an understatement was not 
attributable to an omission of income or an erroneous claim of a deduction or 
credit.84  The Treasury recommended a list of factors to be considered by the courts 
and the I.R.S. for both the “knowledge” and the “inequitable” requirements, while 
also recommending an expansion of Tax Court jurisdiction.85 
Concluding that sound policy reasons existed for the continuance of joint filing 
and joint and several liability, the Treasury failed to endorse any of the proposals that 
would have abruptly changed the method of filing or allocating liability.86  The 
Treasury instead recommended the promulgation of legislation to: 1.) automatically 
suspend collection efforts against one spouse when the other is contesting a proposed 
joint assessment in Tax Court, 2.) provide “innocent spouse” relief to more 
individuals by changing statutory standards to include those with smaller tax bills, 
and 3.) allow more taxpayers who are denied “innocent spouse” relief an opportunity 
to appeal the I.R.S.’s decision to the Tax Court and automatically suspend collection 
attempts until the Tax Court’s decision.87 
V.  CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
With the release of the GAO’s and Treasury’s findings on joint liability and the 
“innocent spouse” provision, Congress took action in the beginning of 1998.  
Scholars, tax professionals, and “innocent spouses” flocked to Washington, D.C., 
with the hopes of influencing the final outcome of any new litigation.88  Both the 
                                                                
83Id. at ¶ 210. 
84Treasury Report, supra note 35, at ¶ 211-12. 
85Id. at ¶ 216-20. 
86Id. at ¶ 225-26.  The Treasury relied on four factors in concluding that joint returns were 
based on sound policy: (1) joint returns treated marriages as one economic unit, (2) joint 
returns permitted spouses to offset each other’s income and losses, (3) joint returns provided 
those couples in similar situations to pay the same tax, and (4) joint returns permitted couples 
in common law property states to have the same income-splitting available to those in 
community property states.  Id.  The Treasury also noted that joint and several liability was 
appropriate in most cases.  Id. 
87Id. at ¶ 229. 
88Examples of people testifying before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee: 
1.  Donald Lubick, Treasury Assistant Secretary, see Joint Liability and Its Impact on 
Innocent Spouses, 105th Legis., (1998) (testimony of Donald Lubick). 
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House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee entertained 
testimonies and statements by such individuals to aid in the determination of the 
appropriate new legislation.89  However, the bills that came out of the House and 
Senate varied greatly. 
The House of Representatives created a House Bill to embody their version of 
reform.  The House was obviously comfortable with the Treasury’s suggestions, 
including many in the House Bill.90  Following the Treasury, the House Bill 
contained the elimination of the “grossly erroneous” requirement, replacing it with a 
requirement that an item simply be “erroneous.”91  House Bill also called for the 
removal of dollar and percentage thresholds for a “substantial understatement”and 
expansion of Tax Court’ jurisdiction, both of which are reflected in the Treasury’ 
suggestions.92  Unlike the Treasury, the House also incorporated “portioned relief”in 
the House Bill.  Under “portioned relief,”a spouse could be relieved of liability to the 
extent that the liability is attributable to a portion of the understatement that the 
spouse did not know of nor had any reason to know.93 
The Senate was more liberal, endorsing a proportionate liability approach similar 
to the ABA’s proposal.  Under the Senate Amendment, a spouse could elect to limit 
joint liability and thus would only be liable to the extent that items giving rise to the 
deficiency were allocable to that spouse.94  Allocations would follow present law 
rules of determining which spouse has the responsibility for reporting under the 
married- filing-separate status.  Income items would follow the source while income 
from joint investments/ businesses would be allocated equally.  Deductions would 
follow ownership of the businesses but personal deductions would be divided 
equally.95  The election to limit liability would apply also to taxes shown on the 
return but not paid.96  The Senate Amendment also included the proposal for 
                                                          
2.  Richard Beck, Professor see Innocent Spouse Issues: Hearing on Taxpayer Rights 
Before the House Committee of Ways and Means, 105th Legis., (1998) (testimony of 
Richard Beck). 
Examples of people testifying before the Senate Finance Committee: 
1.  Josephine Berman, “innocent spouse,” supra note 1. 
2.  Karen Andreasen, “innocent spouse,” see Innocent Spouse Issues: Restructuring 
Hearing on the Internal Revenue Service Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 
105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Karen J. Andreasen). 
3.  David Keating, Senior Counsel, National Taxpayers’ Union, see Reform of the 
Innocent Spouse Issues Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 105th Cong. (1998) 
(testimony of David Keating). 
89Id. 
90H.R. REP. 364(I), 105th Cong. (1998). 
91Id.; Treasury Report, supra note 35. 
92H.R. REP. 364(I), 105th Cong. (1998). 
93Id. 
94S.174, 105th Cong. (1998). 
95Id. 
96Id. 
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additional rules to aid the I.R.S. in preventing inappropriate use of the election, such 
as denying separate liability when fraud existed or the spouse had actual knowledge 
(proven by evidence) of the “erroneous” item.97  Under the Senate Amendment, the 
I.R.S. would be required to notify all joint filers of their right to elect this separate 
liability.98 
VI.  THE RESULT 
Faced with two differing Congressional bills, the Conference Committee created 
the new “innocent spouse” provision, I.R.C. § 6015, which included various sections 
of both the House Bill and the Senate Amendment.99  The new provision was signed 
by President Clinton on July 22, 1998, becoming law and repealing the prior 
“innocent spouse” provision, I.R.C. § 6013(e).  The new provision provides relief 
upon the fulfillment of the following requirements: 
A) a joint return was filed; 
B) the understatement of tax was attributable to an erroneous items of one 
individual filing the return; 
C) the taxpayer requesting relief establishes that he/she did not know, and 
had no reason to know, of such an understatement; 
D) it would be inequitable to hold the taxpayer liable.100 
With a quick glance, differences between the previous “innocent spouse” 
provision I.R.C. § 6013(e) and the new provision I.R.C. § 6015 seem minimal.101  
However, a more detailed review of I.R.C. § 6015's main requirements for “innocent 
spouse” relief reveals that certain words have been subtly deleted, creating quite a 
difference between the old and the new.  The “understatement” under I.R.C. § 6015 
is not required to be “substantial,” such as the $500 or percentage threshold required 
under old I.R.C. § 6013(e).102  Also unlike old I.R.C. § 6013(e), the taxpayer 
requesting relief does not have to prove that the “erroneous” items were “grossly 
erroneous” or have “no basis in law or fact,” requirements that had led to differing 
interpretations among the courts. 
The new provision I.R.C. § 6015 includes more fundamental changes.  Though 
the knowledge” test still exists in I.R.C. § 6015, a taxpayer may be liable only for the 
                                                                
97Id. 
98Id. 
99I.R.C. § 6015 (1998). 
100Id. 
101See supra note 9, and accompanying text (listing the requirements of old I.R.C. 
§ 6013(3)). 
102The “understatement” required under I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1)(B) is defined by 
§ 6662(d)(2)(A), which defines “understatement” as “the excess of the amount of the tax 
required to be shown on the return for the taxable year, over the amount of the tax imposed 
which is shown on the return, reduced by any rebate.” 
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portion of the understatement of which the taxpayer knew or had reason to know 
existed.103  The new provision also expands the Tax Court’s ability to determine 
appropriate relief and disallows any I.R.S. collection on an assessment until the Tax 
Court’s decision is final or during the ninety-day period that the taxpayer has to 
petition the Tax Court.104  This change allows the taxpayer to petition the Tax Court 
without having to pay the assessment first.  Upon attempting to assess a tax 
deficiency, the I.R.S. is now required to send a notice to both filers of the joint return 
under I.R.C. § 6015 instead of freely choosing which spouse to notify.105 
Section 6015 also makes it easier for a taxpayer to obtain equitable relief than 
under old I.R.C. § 6013.  If the taxpayer can not prove the four main requirements to 
obtain “innocent spouse” relief, equitable relief may still be available under 
regulations for equitable relief to be issued under I.R.C. § 6015.106  Such regulations 
can provide relief for underpayments of tax that are not covered under the statutory 
language of I.R.C. § 6015, which includes only “understatements.”  The I.R.S. 
released interim guidance regarding the requirements for equitable innocent spouse 
relief on December 7, 1998, under Notice 98-61.107 
To obtain equitable relief under I.R.C. § 6015(f), the taxpayer must have made a 
joint return for the taxable year for which relief is sought, the taxpayer could not 
obtain relief under I.R.C. § 6015(b) or I.R.C. § 6015(c), relief was applied for within 
two years of the first collection attempt, liability is still owed at the time the relief is 
requested, no assets were transferred between the spouses as part of a fraudulent 
scheme, no disqualified assets were transferred, and the individual did not file the 
joint return with fraudulent intent.108  Notice 98-61 also set out circumstances under 
which equitable relief from tax liability would ordinarily be granted: 1.) The liability 
reported on the joint return was unpaid at time filed; 2.) the individual is no longer 
married to or is separated from the other individual on the joint return; 3.) the 
individual did not know nor had any reason to know the tax would not be paid and it 
was reasonable to believe the spouse would pay the liability; and 4.) the individual 
would suffer undue hardship if relief was not granted.109  The I.R.S. also established 
factors weighing in favor of equitable relief and factors weighing against granting 
equitable relief for those taxpayers who requested equitable relief but did not meet 
any of the circumstances in which equitable relief would ordinarily be granted.  
These factors include the marital status of the requesting taxpayer, any hardships the 
taxpayer would endure if held liable, the existence of abuse, and a legal obligation by 
the non-requesting spouse pursuant to a divorce decree.110  Creation of the deficiency 
by the requesting spouse, knowledge or reason to know of the deficiency by the 
                                                                
103I.R.C. § 6015(b)(2). 
104I.R.C. § 6015(e). 
105I.R.C. § 6015(d). 
106I.R.C. § 6015(f). 
107I.R.S. Notice 98-61, 1998-51 C.B. 13. 
108Id. at 14.  See infra note 154 (providing the definition of a “disqualified asset”). 
109Id. 
110Id. 
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requesting spouse, significant benefits to the requesting spouse, and the requesting 
spouse’s legal obligation were factors the I.R.S. determined to weigh against 
equitable relief.111 
Proportional liability represents the most radical change between the old and new 
“innocent spouse” provision.  Section 6015 allows a taxpayer, who is either divorced 
or separated from the spouse with whom the taxpayer filed a joint return, to elect to 
limit his/her joint liability relating to that return.112 If the election is made, the 
taxpayer will be only liable for the portion of a deficiency allocable to that 
taxpayer.113  The taxpayer, however, must elect separate liability within two years 
after the date the I.R.S. has begun collection activities.114  I.R.C. § 6015 establishes 
rules to ensure against improper abuse of the election.  For example, election is 
disallowed if the taxpayer had actual knowledge of the item creating the deficiency 
or if a fraudulent transfer of assets occurred.115 
VII.  EXAMPLES OF THE APPLICATION OF I.R.C. § 6015 
Examples will be provided to best understand the requirements of I.R.C. § 6015.  
The first two examples will use the facts and circumstances of Josephine Berman’s 
case.116  The facts will be varied appropriately to apply to the different situations that 
I.R.C. § 6015 addresses.  The following examples will be based on actual cases and 
will unveil the differences in application between the old I.R.C. § 6013(e) and the 
new provision, I.R.C. § 6015. 
Main Facts for Examples 1 and 2: While married, Josephine Berman filed joint 
returns with her husband, Bob.117  The I.R.S disallowed deductions in relation to 
Bob’s subchapter S corporation in the years 1968-1970, creating a deficiency of 
$62,000.  Josephine was never involved in her husband’s business activities nor was 
involved in any business or tax decisions.  Josephine’s only function regarding tax 
issues was to sign the joint return.  Josephine had three children and made $13,000 
per year as a dental assistant.  Josephine would never be able to pay off the $62,000 
liability herself and would never be able to retire.118 
A.  Example 1 
Assume that Josephine is still married to Bob.  The I.R.S. is attempting collection 
activities for the deficiencies.  Josephine applies for “innocent spouse” relief under 
                                                                
111Id. at 14-15. 
112I.R.C. § 6015(a) provides the election while I.R.C. § 6015(c) describes the method and 
regulations relating to electing separate liability. 
113I.R.C. § 6015(c)(1). 
114I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(A). 
115I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C). 
116See supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing Berman’s statement). 
117Though in her testimony Berman did not state her former husband’s name, let’s call him 
Bob in these examples. 
118Berman, supra note 1. 
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I.R.C. § 6015 within two years of date the I.R.S. began collection activities.  No 
fraudulent transfers of property took place between Josephine and Bob. 
In assessing if Josephine is eligible for “innocent spouse” relief under new 
§ 6015, the I.R.S. first considers the requirements of I.R.C. § 6015(b).119  It can be 
easily established that Josephine and Bob did file joint returns for the 1968-1970 
taxable years.  The erroneous deduction of legal expenses by Bob constitutes an 
“understatement” of tax.  The lack of knowledge requirement may be harder to 
prove.  The facts of the case seem to arguably indicate that Josephine did not know 
of the deduction.  Josephine only signed the tax returns and was not part of any 
business or tax decision.  Even if the I.R.S. does disagree with this conclusion, 
Josephine can elect separate liability under I.R.C. § 6015(b)(2).  Under this section 
Josephine can be relieved of the portion of the liability of which she did not know.  
A review of the facts may lead to the conclusion that she should not be liable for any 
portion of the deficiency because she did not know about any part of it, though there 
is uncertainty regarding how the I.R.S. or courts will determine if a spouse knew of 
the item or had any reason to know of it.   
Under the facts and circumstances, it would arguably be inequitable to hold 
Josephine liable for the deficiency, as required under the final requirement of I.R.C. 
§ 6015.  With three children to care for and a salary of $13,000, Josephine would be 
financially strapped if held liable. 
Josephine could possibly obtain equitable relief under I.R.C. § 6015(f) even if the 
I.R.S. denied her request for relief under I.R.C. § 6015(b) for failing to meet one of 
the requirements discussed in the above paragraphs.  To obtain equitable relief under 
I.R.C. § 6015(f), Josephine must meet the requirements prepared by the I.R.S. in 
Notice 98-61.120  The threshold requirements under Notice 98-61 are easily met by 
Josephine.  Josephine did file a joint return for the taxable year in which relief is 
requested, applied for relief within the requisite time period, did not have any assets 
transferred to her husband, and did not file with fraudulent intent.  The I.R.S. would 
next consider the factors weighing against and for holding Josephine liable.  
Josephine can argue that she would suffer an undue hardship if she were held liable, 
citing her low salary, the needed support of her children, her education level, and the 
enormous amount of the liability.  Since none of the liability was attributable to her, 
there was no evidence she knew of the deficiency when the taxes were filed, and she 
received no significant benefit for the deficiency since it related to Bob’s business, 
there seems to be no factors weighing against granting her equitable relief.  Even if 
Josephine was not granted “innocent spouse” relief under I.R.C. § 6015(b), she still 
has a chance to receive equitable relief under I.R.C. § 6015(f).  However, if the 
I.R.S. decided otherwise, under I.R.C. § 6015(e), Josephine can petition the Tax 
Court for review and defer the I.R.S.’s collection activities until the Tax Court’s 
decision. 
                                                                
119See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (describing the requirements of I.R.C. 
§ 6015). 
120See supra note 107-11 and accompanying text (describing the requirements of Notice 
98-61). 
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B.  Example 2 
Assume that Josephine and Bob divorced three years before the I.R.S. began 
collection activities for the $62,000 deficiency.  Josephine filed for relief under 
I.R.C. § 6015 within the requisite time period.  No fraudulent transfers of property 
between Bob and Josephine took place.   
Under I.R.C. § 6015, divorced or separated spouses have an easier path to limit 
their liability.  Josephine could apply for separate liability under I.R.C. § 6015(c) 
since she is divorced and did not live in the same household as Bob for the year prior 
to the date she filed the election, no fraudulent transfers or transfers of disqualified 
assets occurred, and she applied for the election within the requisite time period.  
Meeting those requirements provides Josephine exemption from all deficiencies for 
which she is not responsible.  Since allocation of the tax items are allocated as if 
Josephine and Bob had filed married- filing-separate returns, Josephine would not be 
held liable for any of the deficiency.  Because the deficiencies related to Bob’s S 
corporation, the “erroneous” deductions would have been included on Bob’s separate 
return.  Thus, Josephine is exonerated from liability for the items allocable to Bob. 
C.  Example 3 
Vicki Michaels applied for “innocent spouse” relief under I.R.C. § 6013(e) in 
1995 when the I.R.S. determined that Vicki and her husband had a tax deficiency of 
$99,584 due to disallowed short term and ordinary losses and disallowed commodity 
trading deductions from their 1976 joint income tax return.121  The specific issues 
were whether the substantial understatement was attributable to grossly erroneous 
items and whether it would be inequitable to hold Vicki liable for the deficiency.122  
Though Vicki contended that the transactions giving rise to the deficiencies were 
shams and thus the losses reported were grossly erroneous, the I.R.S. disagreed.  The 
Tax Court concluded that because Vicki could not prove that there was no basis in 
law for the loss deductions, the items were not “grossly erroneous.”123 
On the issue of inequity, the Tax Court held that it was not “inequitable” to hold 
Vicki liable because she had received joint and several benefits from the loss when it 
was claimed.  Evidence of jewelry worth $6,000 given to Vicki from her husband 
and a trip to Europe was used as the basis for the Tax Court’s conclusion that Vicki 
received a significant benefit from the tax deficiency.124 
It is unfortunate for Vicki that her case occurred in 1995 under old § 6013(e) 
instead of the new provision, I.R.C. § 6015.  If Vicki would have requested relief 
under I.R.C. § 6015, she would not have had to prove that the deductions were 
“grossly erroneous” or that they had no basis in law or in fact.  Proof that the 
deduction was just “erroneous” will suffice under I.R.C. § 6015. 
The “inequitable” test under I.R.C. § 6013(e) still survives under I.R.C. 
§ 6015(b).  Thus, there is uncertainty whether the courts and the I.R.S. will still 
consider the receipt of “significant benefits” as a test in determining inequity.  
                                                                
121Michaels v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 3056, 3057 (1995). 
122Id. at *3. 
123Id. at *4. 
124Id. at *5. 
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However, I.R.C. § 6015 would have provided Vicki with another method of 
requesting relief due to inequity under I.R.C. § 6015(f).  After considering the 
hardship that would be imposed on Vicki125 if she were held liable as a factor 
indicating inequity under Notice 98-61, the Tax Court might have decided 
differently.  Poor Vicki.  If her case had been heard pursuant to I.R.C. § 6015, she 
might not have been jointly liable for the $99,954 deficiency. 
D.  Example 4 
Robert Wolski was denied “innocent spouse” relief by the Tax Court because he 
failed to meet the “substantial understatement” requirement of the prior “innocent 
spouse” provision, I.R.C. § 6013(e).126  Robert’s former spouse, Janet, had received 
self-employment income of $1,996.50 and failed to report it on their 1989 joint 
return, resulting in a tax deficiency of $256.127  Robert was denied “innocent” spouse 
relief under the Tax Court’s holding that the item was not “grossly erroneous” under 
I.R.C. § 6013(e) because the item did not affect a deduction, credit, or basis and 
because the tax deficiency was not “substantial.”128  I shall consider for this example 
only the “substantial understatement” requirement and not the “grossly erroneous” 
requirement since it was discussed in Example 3.  Because the tax deficiency was 
only $256, it did not constitute a substantial understatement under old I.R.C. 
§ 6013(e), which required an item of at least $500.  Under I.R.C. § 6015, however, 
dollar thresholds are nonexistent and thus even a small tax deficiency of $256 would 
constitute an “understatement.”  Robert would have also been able to prove under 
I.R.C. § 6015 that the “understatement” was attributable to the other filing spouse, 
Janet.  The tax deficiency was easily traceable to Janet, who had earned the self-
employment income. 
E.  Example 5 
Andrew Justi was denied “innocent spouse” relief under I.R.C. § 6103(e) by the 
Tax Court because he failed the “knowledge” requirement.129  Andrew’s wife had 
been employed as a secretary with an annual salary of $16,185.  After a promotion to 
director of the employee activities department, Andrew’s wife received consulting 
fees from her company and commissions from vendors.  Andrew and his wife 
subsequently bought a new home, increasing their monthly mortgage payments 
substantially.  Andrew, though, gave his paychecks to his wife who paid all the bills 
and managed the household finances.130  The Tax Court held that Andrew should 
have realized that income was omitted from the joint returns with his wife and that 
he should have investigated further into the possible omission.131  The Tax Court, 
after reviewing Andrew’s standard of living and his level of education, concluded 
                                                                
125Id. 
126Wolski v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3141 (1994). 
127Id. at *1. 
128Id. at *2. 
129Justi v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 717 (1994). 
130Id. at *2. 
131Id. at *4. 
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that the Justi’s standard of living increased due to Mrs. Justi’s omission of income 
and that Andrew was a well-educated engineer and thus should have known about 
the omission.132 
Though Andrew’s request was denied because he should have known of the 
omission, the facts of the case indicated that he only actually knew of $700 that his 
wife omitted from income on their return, as opposed to the $45,000 for which he 
was held jointly liable.  Though a court could possibly find that Andrew should have 
known about the omission under I.R.C. § 6015 also, it is worth discussing the 
manner in which Andrew could have escaped liability under I.R.C. § 6015.  Andrew 
could have been held liable only for the $700 omission133 that he actually knew about 
under “apportionment of relief,” I.R.C. § 6015(b)(2).  Under this section, Andrew 
would be liable only for the portion of the understatement of which he was aware, 
$700, and he would not be liable for the portion of the understatement of which he 
was not aware, approximately $44,300.  The difference between old § 6013(e) and 
the new provision I.R.C. § 6015 would have made quite a difference in Andrew’s 
liability. 
F.  Example 6 
Elizabeth Stiteler was held jointly and severally liable for approximately 
$470,000 because the Tax Court concluded that she failed to prove that it would be 
“inequitable” to hold her liable, as required under I.R.C. § 6013(e).134  Elizabeth did 
not work the majority of her marriage and was only making $6 an hour when she 
was assessed for tax deficiencies arising from joint returns she had filed with her ex-
husband.  When Elizabeth and her husband divorced, Elizabeth received proceeds 
from the sale of a home, secured notes, spousal maintenance, cash, and a 
condominium.135  The Tax Court concluded that Elizabeth failed the “inequitable” 
element because she received an “indirect benefit” due to the transfer of property 
pursuant to her and her husband’s divorce.  The property in question had been 
purchased by her husband with the money available from understating their taxes, 
the court concluded.136 
If Elizabeth’s request for “innocent spouse” relief would have been under I.R.C. 
§ 6015, the outcome may have been different.  Since the requesting spouse may still 
receive equitable relief under I.R.C. § 6015(f) even if the requirements of I.R.C. 
§ 6015(b) are not all met, Elizabeth may have received equitable relief under this 
new provision.  Elizabeth pointed out to the court that she would suffer a severe 
hardship if she were held jointly liable for the huge tax deficiency because she 
earned only $150 every two weeks.137  Notice 98-61 names “hardship” as one of the 
factors to consider in determining if equitable relief should be provided.  The 
evidence of such a meager income in the face of a huge liability may have swayed 
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the Tax Court to allow equitable relief to Elizabeth.  Another factor considered under 
Notice 98-61 is the non-requesting spouse’s legal obligation pursuant to a divorce 
decree or agreement for any liabilities.138  Elizabeth and her husband signed a 
separation agreement which stated that the husband would be liable for all liabilities 
for federal or state income taxes, penalties, or interest.139  Between the satisfaction of 
the hardship and legal obligation factors, Elizabeth would likely have received relief 
under I.R.C. § 6015. 
G.  Example 7 
The Tax Court denied John DeMott “innocent spouse” relief under I.R.C. 
§ 6013(e) because John had reason to know of a “substantial understatement.”140  
John’s wife was in an alcoholic rehabilitation program when John was calculating 
their taxes.  John’s wife, who managed a newsletter business, simply told John to 
estimate her wages as about half as much as the previous year.  No evidence 
indicated he knew the actual amount of her wages.141  Though he was denied relief 
under I.R.C. § 6013(e) in 1994, John may have fared better if he had been applying 
under I.R.C. § 6015. 
John was divorced from his wife in 1990.142  If John had been requesting relief 
under I.R.C. § 6015, he could have elected proportional liability under I.R.C. 
§ 6015(c).  No evidence in John’s case existed to demonstrate that: 1) John had 
actual knowledge of the deficiency, 2) John and his wife fraudulently transferred 
assets, or 3) John and his ex- wife were still living in the same household at the time 
of the proportionate election.143  Thus, it appears that John would have satisfied the 
required elements of I.R.C. § 6015(c) to obtain proportionate liability.144  John would 
have likely been liable only for the deficiency attributable to his tax items. 
VIII.  CRITICISMS AND COMMENTS ON THE NEW PROVISION 
As the examples above demonstrate, the differences between the previous 
“innocent spouse” provision, old § 6013(e), and the new I.R.C. § 6015 can seem 
substantial.  However, the examples above may also provide insight to some of the 
problems that may still be evident under I.R.C. § 6015.  Critics have already zoned in 
on such possible problems. 
The new provision fails to provide relief in situations where the correct tax was 
shown on the tax return, but the tax was not paid.145  The main requirements for 
                                                                
138See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (describing the factors considered under 
Notice 98-61). 
139Stitler, supra note 134. 
140DeMott v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 56 (1994). 
141Id. at *1 at 57. 
142Id. 
143Id. 
144See I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C); I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(ii); I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(i)(II). 
145Toni Robinson & Mary Ferrari, The New Innocent Spouse Provision: Reason and Law 
Walking Hand in Hand?, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 158-60, 846 (1998), Doc 98-25818 (15 
pages). 
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“innocent spouse” relief found in I.R.C. § 6015(c) provides for relief only from an 
“understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items.”146  Though Notice 98-61 
provides equitable relief for such unpaid tax, the taxpayer is required to once again 
proceed through a myriad of requirements to obtain such a relief.147  Relief for such 
unpaid taxes may prove hard to obtain. 
Critics point out that a no-fault system was created for divorced or separated 
spouses while a taxpayer who is still married still must overcome the inherent stigma 
of guilt and innocence built into the provision.148  For example, divorced spouses 
may simply file for proportional liability under I.R.C. § 6015(c) while a married 
taxpayer must prove each of the elements of I.R.C. § 6015(c) in order to obtain 
relief.  The married taxpayer is forced to disprove that he/she had knowledge of the 
item creating the deficiency, forcing the taxpayer to disprove his/her “guilt” in 
overlooking such an item.  The divorced taxpayer is allowed to skip this step and can 
be immediately cleared of all liability if none of the deficiency is allocable to 
him/her.  The married taxpayer is theoretically punished for staying married. Such a 
concept is contrary to the underlying principle of joint returns: viewing a couple as 
one lasting economic unit. 
Divorced taxpayers requesting relief also have one more method of obtaining 
such relief, as compared to the married taxpayers.  Divorced or separated taxpayers 
can chose proportional liability under I.R.C. § 6015(c) or “innocent spouse” relief 
under I.R.C. § 6015(b).  However, a married taxpayer has only one shot at obtaining 
relief, through “innocent spouse” relief under I.R.C. § 6015(b).  Again, this punishes 
marriage and critics wonder if it even encourages marital breakups.149  Divorced 
taxpayers who would have been liable under I.R.C. § 6013(e) now are able to simply 
elect proportionate liability while married taxpayers are not so lucky to have such a 
provision apply.150 
Critics also claim that the new provision provides opportunities for taxpayers to 
manipulate the system.151  For example, sham divorces could occur just to take 
advantage of the proportionate liability.  Critics claim, “[n]othing in the new 
provision appears to prevent taxpayers from engaging in a sham divorce; that is, 
nothing appears to prevent former joint filers from obtaining a divorce to obtain the 
benefits of proportional liability while continuing to cohabit.”152  It is unlikely, 
though, that this abuse would occur in great quantities since most couples would not 
sacrifice marriage for a tax break. 
Critics state that transfers to third parties while one spouse claims proportionate 
liability could occur.  Critics question if situations could arise where spouses 
separate for twelve months, then have the low earner spouse elect proportional 
                                                                
146I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1)(B). 
147See supra note 107 and accompanying text (describing the requirements of Notice 98-
61). 
148Robinson, supra note 145, at 846. 
149Id. at 847. 
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liability while the other spouse transfers assets to a third party.153  Internal Revenue 
Code § 6015, however, contains various subsections to prevent spouses who attempt 
fraudulent schemes from successfully obtaining relief.154 
Section 6015 also fails to provide all the necessary rules to apply proportionate 
liability, nor does it require a complete recalculation of tax liability.155  Unless a 
Treasury Regulation can aid in such determinations, differing interpretations among 
courts could occur.  Each court may determine a different formula.  Like under the 
old I.R.C. § 6013(e), the variations among forums could lead to completely different 
results in similar situations. 
The most controversial element of the new provision, proportionate liability, is 
also creating a stir among critics.  All taxpayers going through a divorce will now 
rush to make the proportional election.156  As written in the Matrimonial Strategist, 
“[p]art of every divorce lawyer’s repertoire will be the filing of a separate tax return 
election with the Internal Revenue Service.”157  Divorce lawyers will use the 
proportionate liability election as a “bargaining tool” in divorce proceedings.158 
However, Christopher Rizek, associate tax legislative counsel at the Treasury, 
warned that such premature filings could “constitute malpractice for protecting them 
from something that doesn’t exist.”159  Furthermore, Rizek pointed out that the I.R.S. 
would be overcome with paperwork and records if, in every divorce proceeding, both 
spouses immediately filed for proportionate liability.160  He also stated that as a result 
                                                                
153Robinson, supra note 145, at 847. 
154I.R.C. § 6015 includes the following subsections that all deal with fraudulent schemes: 
1.  I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(ii).  Taxpayers cannot elect separate liability if the Secretary 
can demonstrate that a fraudulent scheme involving asset transfers occurred by the 
individuals filing the joint return. 
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of everyone in a divorce proceeding filing, the I.R.S. would either lose the election 
or will suspect that there may have been a deficiency on that couple’s tax returns.161 
The most shocking criticism of the new provision is the cost the Treasury will 
have to bear in implementing the new provision.  Critics projected the changes will 
cost the Treasury $1.406 billion dollars by the year 2007.162  With the need for 
Treasury Regulations to aid in interpreting portions of the provision, such as the 
“knowledge” requirement, it makes one wonder if the changes were worth it or if 
another proposal would have been more cost effective. 
IX.  UPDATES  
Since the promulgation and enactment of the new “innocent spouse” provision, 
the I.R.S. has been busy preparing new forms required to be created under I.R.C. 
§ 6015.  Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6015(f), the Secretary prepared procedures under which 
requesting spouses can obtain equitable relief.  The procedures to obtain equitable 
relief are contained within Notice 98-61.163 
The I.R.S. has also released new versions of the “innocent spouse” relief forms 
and publications.  Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6015, the I.R.S. must set procedures for 
alerting married taxpayers of their joint and several liability on all appropriate tax 
publications and also must notify the taxpayers of their right to relief.  The new 
provisions are provided in I.R.S. Publication 971, labeled, “Innocent Spouse 
Relief.”164  The I.R.S. is also telling taxpayers to use the revised Form 8857, labeled 
“Request for Innocent Spouse Relief,” to request relief.165 
X.  CONCLUSION 
The new “innocent spouse” provision, I.R.C. § 6015, allows a greater number of 
taxpayers to obtain relief from the joint and several liability associated with joint 
returns.  Though critics have already dissected the provision, searching for potential 
weaknesses, Treasury Regulations will be published to aid courts and the I.R.S. in 
applying the provision.  The magnitude of the provision’s effect cannot be measured 
until the provision is applied to actual cases.  And when the provision enables even 
one more taxpayer to obtain relief, “innocent spouses” like Josephine Berman will be 
satisfied, acknowledging that the Congress and the I.R.S. worked together effectively 
to ensure that taxpayers can obtain the relief much deserved and much awaited. 
JESSICA LUBY ANGNEY166 
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